Defensive positioning

Nine fielders cannot cover a field. Every alignment leaves holes somewhere, and positioning is the choice of where to leave them. Play deep and the single drops in front; play shallow and the double goes over your head. Pinch the lines and the ball finds the gap.

The cleanest example is the drawn-in infield with a runner on third and fewer than two out. Bringing the infielders in lets them cut down the runner at the plate on a ground ball — and lets more ground balls through for hits. It trades runs now for baserunners later, and so, like the bunt, its answer depends on whether one run is the whole game.

Early in a game, with one out, the infield should come in only if it costs fewer than 31% extra hits on ground balls; with nobody out, fewer than 17%. Tied in the bottom of the ninth with one out, the threshold climbs to 52% — exactly the rate at which the runner would have scored with the infield back, because a run and a hit now cost the same thing: the game. The baserunner a drawn-in infield gives up would only matter in a later inning that never comes.

KBO hitters batted .317 on balls in play this season; fielders made 713 errors, 0.50 a team game. Those are the only fielding facts the public record holds. Where every ball was hit, and where every fielder stood, is tracked inside the clubs and nowhere else.

The KBO has restricted the infield shift since 2024, as MLB did from 2023: two infielders on each side of second base when the pitch is thrown. That rules out the most extreme overloads but leaves a great deal of room — depth, the outfield, and the shading of each infielder within his half.